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The foreign element in foreign commerce antitrust compounds the uncer-
tainty inherent in all antitrust doctrine, for judicial discretion in statutory
interpretation is matched by judicial discretion in the determination of per-
sonal and legislative jurisdiction. Even if there were more precedents avail-
able, their predictive value would be limited. Not only are business fact
situations very largely unique, but there is room for judges to continue to
mold the law in the light of jurisdictional reason no less than under the Sher-
man Act's own rule of reason.1
In the twenty years since this statement was written, all of antitrust law,
not just foreign commerce antitrust, has moved toward a rule of reason
analysis. The Supreme Court, for example, first handed down White Mo-
tor,2 replaced it with Schwinn s and then bounced back with Continental
TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.4 The helpful, or at any rate predictable,
presumptions of Philadelphia National Banks have given way to the uncer-
tain world of Marine Bancoraoration6 and General Dynamics,7 with their
emphasis on ad hoc determinations and economic proof. In sum, many of
the presumptions and rules that formerly separated safe channels from un-
t Chief, Los Angeles Field Office, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice. This Article was
written while the author was still in private practice in Los Angeles. The views expressed
herein are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice.
The author expresses her appreciation to Douglas E. Rosenthal, Chief, Foreign Commerce
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1. K. BPEwsTER, ANTrrRuST AND AMERICAN BUSINEss ABROAD 53 (1958).
2. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
3. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
4. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
5. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
6. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
7. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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safe shoals are disappearing, and in their place only one navigational aid
remains for antitrust counselors: the ever-flexible rule of reason.
This trend toward wide-open rule of reason evaluation is a mixed bless-
ing. Ideally, business arrangements should stand or fall on their merits
rather than on mechanical rules established in other cases. But evaluating
every business transaction on a rule of reason basis can be prohibitively
time-consuming, considering the large number of transactions that occur
every day. When the only guideline available is that "reasonable restric-
tions are legal, unreasonable restrictions are not," business may forego le-
gitimate transactions and the Government may decline to investigate
unreasonably restrictive arrangements simply because neither is willing to
invest the time and money or to accept the risk involved in a rule of reason
analysis. Moreover, a rule of reason analysis requires not only a familiarity
with the existing market structure, but also an ability to spot trends and
predict the likely future effects of a contemplated transaction upon the mar-
ket. Such an extensive evaluation is often not cost-justified where the
transaction is relatively small or just one of many.
In terms of the rule of reason test, international technology transfer is at a
double disadvantage. International licensing arrangements are often com-
plex, making market predictions difficult, yet may not be major transactions
for the parties involved. Accordingly, application of the rule of reason in
this area is a burdensome requirement for transactions that often do not
merit large expenditures of legal time and fees. To compound the problem,
little judicial precedent exists in the international technology licensing area,
so that even conclusions of counsel based on a careful and lengthy rule of
reason analysis are not certain to withstand antitrust attack.
The thesis of this Article is that experience, logic, and cost considerations
justify replacing the rule of reason with rules of presumptive legality and
presumptive illegality in many categories of international licensing restric-
tions.8 As discussed below, experience with domestic antitrust law has es-
tablished rules of per se illegal conduct in technology licensing. 9 To the
extent that these rules deal with economic realities resulting from a particu-
lar restriction imposed in a given market of a given size and structure, the
only question is whether the addition of a foreign firm justifies following
different rules. A rule of presumptive illegality starts with the premise that
transactions that are per se illegal domestically should also be illegal when
8. Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44
ANTrrRuST LJ. 537 (1975).
9. Seenotes 34-35 infraand accompanying text; Remarks of Bruce B. Wilson, then Special
Ass't to the Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Fourth
New England Antitrust Conference, Patent and Know-how License Agreements: Field of Use,
Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions (Nov. 6, 1970) (copy on file at the offices of the
Cornell International Law Journal).
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a foreign participant is involved, unless the parties can demonstrate that the
arrangement is a reasonable one.
Logic also supports the conclusion that if a restriction-for example, re-
quiring a licensee to purchase nonpatented goods as a condition of licensing
the patented technology-has been shown to be so anticompetitive as to be
per se illegal when practiced in U.S. markets, it is not likely to have a
significantly different impact on U.S. competition simply because one or
more of the participants are foreign firms. The economic effects will be
similar. Thus, legal standards should be similar, except where the interna-
tional setting presents overriding considerations that save the restriction
from illegality. A rule of presumptive illegality would allow the "interna-
tional" factors to be taken into account by permitting the contracting par-
ties to rebut the presumption of illegality with evidence of such
counterbalancing justifications.
The third factor supporting the adoption of a rule of presumptive illegal-
ity for international licensing restrictions is cost. A rule of reason analysis
may or may not produce acceptable results in terms of accurate identifica-
tion of anticompetitive restrictions; 10 it certainly will not do so if its use is so
costly and time-consuming that both business and the Government avoid
applying it. Rather than abandon any examination of the numerous inter-
national technology transfer restrictions imposed every day by U.S. and
foreign firms, a simpler, less costly test should be developed: in this case,
categories of presumptive illegality.
I
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. APPLICABILITY OF OTHER LAWS
Before examining U.S. antitrust law, one caveat is in order. In every
international technology transfer situation, several bodies of law may be
applicable and must be considered. In recent years, a growing number of
foreign countries have adopted laws and created regulatory agencies to con-
trol technology transfers and payments within their borders. Many U.S.
antitrust lawyers are unfamiliar with these measures, which are often based
on considerations of nationalism or revenue collection, rather than on anti-
trust principles. For example, the Andean Pact countries-Bolivia, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela-as well as Brazil and Argentina, have
made technology transfer payments an important part of their overall regu-
lation of foreign capital. All technology transfer arrangements and pay-
10. SeeBok, Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act and the Merging fLaw andEconomics 74 HAv.
L. Rxv. 226 (1960).
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ments in those countries must be registered and approved, and many
ancillary restrictions common in the United States are prohibited.
Over and above the requirements imposed by foreign laws, U.S. tax laws,
import-export controls, and financial regulations may also apply to interna-
tional technology transfers. These topics are well beyond the scope of this
Article, and it will henceforth be assumed that competent counsel has dealt
with them.
B. THE BASIC SUBJECT MATTER
U.S. law protects ownership rights in four major categories of so-called
intellectual property: copyrights, trademarks, patents, and know-how. The
law of copyrights guards the uniqueness of a written or performed creative
work. The law of trademarks protects the distinctive way a product or
service is identified and distinguished through the use of a symbol or a
mark. The law of patents safeguards inventions that meet sufficient statu-
tory and constitutional standards of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.
Know-how, often referred to as trade secrets, protects technical knowledge,
experience, and skills that are secret and valuable and that are most effec-
tively transferred either by a writing or by observation of the actual per-
formance of those possessing such knowledge, experience, and skills.
Know-how may consist of clearly patentable, doubtfully patentable, or
clearly nonpatentable subject matter.1
Although the statutory schemes for protecting copyrights, trademarks,
patents, and know-how vary, the interests protected and the effects that li-
censing these properties have upon competition are sufficiently similar to
justify subjecting them to a collective analysis. Thus, the following discus-
sion will focus on technology and intellectual property in general, without
attempting to distinguish among the various forms. There is one caveat,
however, to treating the four types of technology as one: know-how as a
rule is less protected from antitrust attack than the other forms. The U.S.
Constitution authorizes the granting of exclusive rights in patents and copy-
rights, 12 and Congress has implemented the Constitution by defining statu-
tory rights. 13 Know-how, however, lacks a statutory scheme similar to those
that define the scope of the other technology rights. Trade secrets and
know-how need not meet the novelty, utility, and nonobviousness require-
ments imposed on a patent, requirements which have the beneficial effect of
preventing the creation of monopolies providing no social benefit. Also,
the patent right extends only to what the inventor claims and is limited to
seventeen years. Know-how licenses, in contrast, have no such statutory
11. SeeKewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482-92 (1974).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. Eg., Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 804 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976)).
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limitation. Accordingly, the Department of Justice has taken the position
in its Antitrust Guide for International Operations14 (the Guide) that re-
straints that are ancillary to trade secret and know-how licenses are subject
to stricter scrutiny than patent licenses: "Because know-how licensing lacks
the protections and legislative mandate of the patent system however,
know-how licenses will in general be subject to antitrust standards which, if
anything, are stricter than those applied to patent licenses."15
The practical problem created by the Department's strict position on
know-how licensing is that in the international area, U.S. companies often
use know-how licenses instead of patent licenses because foreign patent
laws may offer less protection than these companies desire. Licensors may
feel they have a better chance to protect their technology by keeping it se-
cret, releasing it only to contractual partners. Furthermore, it is unclear
whether and to what extent U.S. patent law applies abroad.16
C. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A threshold issue in international technology licensing antitrust law is
whether the requisite effect on U.S. commerce, either interstate or foreign,
is present to support subject matter jurisdiction over an international trans-
action. 17 Generally, an activity that does not itself occur in U.S. interstate
commerce is within the scope of the Sherman Act only if it substantially
affects interstate commerce. 18 The same analysis applies to transactions
not directly in U.S. foreign commerce, but that affect U.S. foreign com-
merce: the general requirement is that there be some substantial effect.19
Although language in a few cases indicates that a substantial effect on
foreign commerce is not necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction,20
the Department of Justice in the Guide appears to have adopted the sub-
stantial effect test. The Department has stated that, as a matter of both law
and policy, the Sherman Act applies only where foreign transactions have a
substantial effect upon U.S. foreign commerce, either by adversely affecting
import competition in U.S. markets or by restricting the export and foreign
14. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE], reprinted in ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (1977), and TRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH) No. 266,
pt. 11 (1977).
15. Id at 33-34 (Case F).
16. Deep South Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 523 (1971). But see Dunlop
Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
17. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
18. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967).
19. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., [1963] Trade Cas.
70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modfed, [1965] Trade Cas. 1 70,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
20. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
supplemental opinion, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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Under the principles set forth in the Guide, the sale, transfer, accumula-
tion, or cross-licensing of technology is not necessarily, or even presump-
tively, violative of U.S. antitrust law. The ancillary restrictions included in
a license package may, however, create problems. The first step required
by the Guide in analyzing an international licensing arrangement is to de-
termine whether the arrangement is in fact a cartel device for dividing up or
controlling markets, or is simply a licensor's rational use of his technology.
Among antitrust lawyers, this test is referred to as the Timken test. Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,22 the classic international joint venture
and technology licensing case, involved trademark license agreements and
accompanying ancillary restraints among three related companies: U.S.
Timken, British Timken, and French Timken. British Timken's predeces-
sor and U.S. Timken had made longstanding agreements providing for the
territorial division of world markets. Subsequently, U.S. Timken pur-
chased some of the stock of British Timken and ultimately held about thirty
percent of British Timken's outstanding shares. U.S. Timken and a major
shareholder of British Timken then organized a subsidiary, French Timken.
21. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 14, at 4-5. The recent Supreme Court decision in Pfizer,
Inc. v. Government of India, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978), has sparked further controversy in this area,
since .Jifer could be read as indicating that the Supreme Court is willing to apply U.S. anti-
trust laws where the injury is solely to foreign consumers. Although the Court did not need to
reach the issue, in dicta it noted-
To deny a foreign plaintiff injured by an antitrust violation the right to sue would
defeat [the purposes of the antitrust law]. It would permit a price fixer or a monopo-
list to escape full liability for his illegal ctions and would deny compensation to cer-
tain of his victims, merely because he happens to deal with foreign customers.
Id at 588. Subject matter jurisdiction aficionados are referred to an as yet unresolved debate
for further discussion of this topic. SeeRahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations. What
is Covered, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 9 (1974) ("mhe Act is concerned with restraints of com-
petition which occur in, or which substantially affect any of the commerce, interstate or for-
eign, which Congress regulates."); Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an
International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 34-38 (1974); Rail, .A Rejoinder, 8 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 42 (1974); Remarks of Douglas E. Rosenthal, then Ass't Chief, Foreign Commerce
Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the American Society of International
Law, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in United States Export Trade 3 (Apr. 23, 1977) (copy on file
at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal), partially reprinted in 71 AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. PROC. 214 (1977) (I believe that. . . as a matter of United States law, restraints in
United States export trade which only injure persons in foreign markets may not be made
subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts.").
22. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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The three companies entered into trademark license agreements pursuant to
which they allocated world markets among themselves.
In holding this arrangement illegal, the Supreme Court emphasized that
it was condemning "the aggregation of trade restraints" pursuant to which
the companies had allocated the world markets.23 The Court found that
the three companies entered into the agreements for the purpose of avoid-
ing all competition among themselves and that the trademark licensing pro-
visions were "subsidiary and secondary to the central purpose of allocating
trade territories." 24
The Timken test is of considerable importance. In fact, the Justice De-
partment has emphasized this "aggregation of restraints" approach in two
of its recent cases involving international technology licensing, United
States v. Addison- Wesley Publishing Co.25 and United States v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.26 In Addison- Wesley, the Justice Department charged
the defendants, twenty-one major American publishing houses and certain
alleged co-conspirators, with an unlawful combination and conspiracy in
restraint of foreign and interstate trade and commerce in the distribution
and sale of books, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Named as
co-conspirators were the Publishers Association, a British organization
whose membership includes virtually all major United Kingdom publishing
houses, and individual members of the Association.27
The competitive impact statement filed by the Department of Justice em-
phasized that its attack focused on an across-the-board pattern of licenses
between U.S. and British publishers. All of the licenses in question con-
tained clauses granting the British publishers exclusive rights of distribution
in the "British traditional market" and granting U.S. publishers exclusive
rights in other markets. The Government pointed out that the relief sought
"in no way interfered with the legitimate exercise of specific copyright
rights."28
The Department of Justice took the same approach in United States v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. There the Department emphasized that, al-
though the alleged violation arose out of written technology interchange
agreements between Westinghouse, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., these agreements were not the only issue
in the case: "The combination and conspiracy cannot be understood, the
government believes, solely by examination of these written contracts-for
23. Id at 598.
24. Id
25. [1976] 2 Trade Cas. 61,225 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (consent judgment), approving 41 Fed.
Reg. 32,615 (1976) (proposed consent judgment and competitive impact statement).
26. No. C-70-852-SAW (N.D. CaL, filed Apr. 22, 1970).
27. Because of personal jurisdiction problems, the Government did not name the Publishers
Association and its members as defendants.
28. 41 Fed. Reg. at 32,618.
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what the defendants in fact did is at least as important as what they said in
writing."' 29 The complaint alleged that the parties, in addition to their writ-
ten agreements, maintained an ongoing course of dealing whereby neither
Westinghouse nor Mitsubishi would make bids or sales in the other's terri-
tory. The Justice Department charged that the effect and purpose of the
technology agreements between the parties was to prevent sales by each
party in the other's market area.
B. STEP Two
The second step of the analysis under the Guide is to apply the three-
pronged ancillary restraints test. The Guide states that terms of a licensing
agreement that restrict some amount of competition are permissible, as long
as the restrictions are clearly ancillary to some legitimate purpose, are ap-
propriately limited in scope, and do not significantly harm the interests of
the public. In other words, the Justice Department in antitrust cases very
often focuses on the totality of the circumstances surrounding a transaction
or the particular wording of some clause of a license. For example, the
Department may not challenge an otherwise forbidden restriction limiting
competition if it occurs in a single patent license and is shown to be reason-
ably necessary to further the main purpose of a legitimate technology trans-
fer agreement. In contrast, a broad pattern of restrictions covering a wide
variety of different products, patents, or licensees may be quite objection-
able, because the overall effect of the restrictions is to create a broad territo-
rial allocation between or among the parties. The rule of reason determines
the legality of such international licensing restrictions on the basis of sev-
eral key inquiries, such as:
(1) Is the restriction related to and designed to effectuate the main and
legitimate purpose of the license?
(2) Is the scope and duration of the restriction substantially greater than
necessary to achieve that purpose?
(3) Is the arrangement otherwise reasonable? And how substantial are
the arrangement's adverse effects on the competitive interests that the U.S.
antitrust laws seek to protect?30
At the present time, the Department of Justice applies the "reverse engi-
neering" test in evaluating the reasonableness of the time period of know-
how licenses. The reverse engineering period is defined as the time reason-
ably necessary for independent development of the licensed technology.
The theory behind this standard is that during the period of time required
29. Letter from Thomas E. Kauper, then Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to the Hon. Stanley A. Weigel (Government's Pretrial Brief) (June 13, 1973) (copy
on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
30. SeeANTITRUST GuiDE, supranote 14, at 3-4.
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for someone else to develop the technology or its equivalent, the licensor
would not have faced competition anyway. Accordingly, any restriction
imposed during that period of time would not reduce competition. A re-
striction extending beyond that period, however, might inhibit competition.
In adopting the reverse engineering standard, the Department has rejected
a frequently advanced argument that know-how licenses are reasonable for
the life of the trade secret-regardless of the length of that period-and that
such licenses are only unreasonable once the secret is lost.3 1
A word of caution is necessary at this point. Many years ago, antitrust
law in the technology licensing area came under the influence of the so-
called inherency doctrine, espoused by the Supreme Court in 1938 in Gen-
eral Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. 32 The inherency doc-
trine rests upon two assumptions: (a) one who owns technology has the
inherent right to exclude all others from the use of his property; and there-
fore (b) an owner also has the right to relax the total exclusion and license a
partial exclusion. By way of illustration, in the General Talking Pictures
case, General Electric, Western Electric, and RCA had pooled certain pat-
ents relating to amplifiers. The pooling companies granted licenses to
others that were expressly limited to the sale of the patented amplifiers for
private uses, effectively reserving to pool members the right to use the pat-
ents for commercial purposes. The Supreme Court held that the field of
use restrictive licenses were per se legal. The case has come to stand for the
proposition that an owner of technology may grant licenses to manufacture,
use, or sell his technology upon any conditions not inconsistent with the
scope of his monopoly.33
The inherency test led to an easy rule of thumb for lawyers concerned
with potential antitrust problems in drafting patent and know-how license
agreements: if a restriction could be placed on a licensee in the form of
narrowly defining the scope of the licensor's grant, such as a grant to use the
license for production of only one type of product, the limitation would be a
per se legal limitation on what was being granted. But if the restriction
were instead written as an explicit contractual limitation, it would be
31. The Justice Department's three-pronged test is derived from the ancillary restraints doc-
trine, which, at least since the reign of Queen Anne, has been used to uphold restrictive condi-
tions imposed upon the sale or exchange of property. SeeMitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wns. 181,
24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The Addyston Pipe ancillary restraint theory is that a seller of
property should be able to restrain the buyer from doing the seller an injury that, but for the
sale, the buyer could not have inflicted. Restraining the use of the property so as to prevent
that injury was not reducing competition, but rather securing the seller against increased com-
petition of his own doing.
32. 304 U.S. 175, a.f'd on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
33. Id at 181.
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viewed as a separate ancillary restraint and would be subjected to rule of
reason scrutiny under the antitrust laws.
In this era of the rule of reason and factual economic analysis, one should
not place too much weight upon the mechanistic inherency doctrine of Gen-
eral Talking Pictures. Indeed, since 1938 numerous embellishments and
judicial interpretations have weakened the original doctrine. In 1970 an
official of the Antitrust Division summarized these developments in what
has become known as the "nine no-no's" speech, 34 concluding that there
are nine types of restrictive technology licensing clauses that constitute per
se violations of the antitrust laws.35 Because of some overlap among the
"nine no-no's," they can be condensed into five categories:
(1) tying arrangements that require a licensee to purchase nonpatented
products from the licensor,
(2) horizontal control among patent licensees so that, for example, one
licensee has veto power over other licensees;
(3) resale price maintenance whereby a licensor requires a licensee to
adhere to a specified price in reselling licensed products;
34. Remarks of Wilson, supra note 9; see Remarks of Bruce B. Wilson, then Deputy Ass't
Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Annual Joint Meeting of the
Michigan State Bar Antitrust Law Section and the Patent Trademark and Copyright Law
Section (Sept. 21, 1972), partialy reprinted in [1977] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,146.
35. The nine categories are:
(1) Requiring a licensee to purchase separate products as a condition of obtaining the li-
cense. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
(2) The related practice of mandatory package licensing. American Securit Co. v. Shatter-
proof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
(3) Reciprocal cross-licenses used to form the basis of a cartel. United States v. General
Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1945).
(4) Restraints on where, how, or to whom a patented product is disposed of in the United
States after the licensor has once sold the product to an independent purchaser. United States
v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969).
(5) An agreement that the licensor will not grant further licenses to any third parties with-
out the licensees consent. United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), a f'dper
curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957).
(6) Requiring a licensee to adhere to any specified or minimum price with respect to the
licensee's sale of the licensed product. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977).
(7) Requiring the licensee to pay royalties in an amount not reasonably related to the
licensee's sales products covered by the license rights. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
(8) Extending the license or collecting royalties on it beyond its term of years. Brulotte v.
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
(9) Requiring a licensee to agree in advance to grant back to the licensor title to or an
exclusive license on any new patents or trade secrets the licensee may obtain or develop related
to the licensed technology rights. United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74
(E.D. Mich. 1955), af'dper curiam sub nom. Mac Inv. Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 960
(1956).
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(4) extending the scope of the monopoly by, for example, requiring a
licensee to pay royalties on an expired patent; and
(5) exclusive grantbacks whereby a licensor requires an exclusive
grantback of improvement patents from its licensee.36
The interesting question is whether these five categories should be per se
illegal not only for domestic technology licensing but also for international
licensing arrangements. In the Guide, the Department appears to reject
application of a per se rule to international transactions except for those
involving traditional horizontal restraints:
The rule of reason may have a somewhat broader application to interna-
tional transactions where it is found that (1) experience with adverse effects
on competition is much more limited than in the domestic market, or (2)
there are some special justifications not normally found in the domestic mar-
ket .... We emphasize, however, that the normal per se rules will be ap-
plied fully to basic horizontal restraints designed to affect U.S. market prices
or conditions or to divide the U.S. market from other markets.37
Legitimate know-how licensing arrangements--those that are not subter-
fuges to cover cartel schemes-thus appear to fall within the category to
which the Government would apply its three-pronged rule of reason test.38
A rule of presumptive illegality, however, is more appropriate for these ar-
rangements. Accordingly, the "nine no-no's" of domestic technology li-
censing may perhaps be summarized as "five presumptive no-no's" in the
international sphere. In light of the Justice Department's treatment of
these restrictions as per se illegal in the domestic context, it is probably safe
to say that the Department will at least view them with suspicion, with the
result that the restrictions may well be de facto presumptively illegal re-
gardless of the label or category theoretically assigned to them.
CONCLUSION
The field of international technology licensing antitrust law remains wide
open for the development of legal doctrine. The field has for too long been
characterized by uncertainty, which may well cause businesses either to
forego advantageous licensing arrangements rather than risk exposure to
antitrust liability or to proceed under the rationale that, even if their actions
are illegal, they may not be prosecuted. The first alternative is a wasteful
36. See ANTrrRUST GUIDE, supra note 14, at 42. Concerning this fifth category, the De-
partment acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that exclusive grantbacks of
improvements made by licensees are not per se illegal. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v.
Stokes & Smit Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947). However, the Department is of the opinion that
Transparent-Wrap has been substantially undercut by the later decision in Brulotte v. Thys
Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), and takes the position that exclusive grantbacks should be per se
illegal.
37. ANTITRUST Guin, supranote 14, at 2-3.
38. See, eg., id at 28-39 (Cases E, F, G). But see id at 42-45 (Case I).
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and unnecessary restriction upon our economy; the second fosters an atti-
tude destructive of law enforcement. The presumptive legality/presumptive
illegality categories suggested in this Article are designed to remove some of
the uncertainty and unnecessary expense involved in complying with the
antitrust laws pertaining to international technology licensing.
